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The Use of Special Litigation Committees
to Terminate Shareholder Derivative Suits
MARC I. STEINBERG*

A corporation'sboard of directors will frequently appoint a
special litigation committee when faced with a shareholders'

derivative action against fellow directors. Committee dismissal
of such actions is the subject of increasing scrutiny by the
courts. The author addresses this particularissue by analyzing
the relevant federal and state court decisions and by focusing
on special procedures that should be employed to ensure that
the decision reached by the special litigation committee serves
the best interests of the corporationand its shareholders. The

author concludes that the principle of corporate accountability
should determine the extent to which such committees may exercise their business judgment to bar such shareholderderivative suits.
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INTRODUCTION

What may be viewed as a fairly new defensive strategy in response to shareholders' derivative suits against corporate directors

is the appointment of a special litigation committee by the defendant corporation's board of directors. The committee, usually composed of nondefendant directors, retains outside counsel of unim-

peachable integrity. After calling witnesses, examining documentary evidence, and issuing a detailed report, the committee,
with the concurrence of the special counsel, concludes that the suit
is contrary to the corporation's best interests because of the litigation's improbability of success, its high costs, the disruption to the
company's business, and the adverse impact on employee morale.
Relying on the special litigation committee's report, the corpora-

tion seeks to dismiss the complaint.1
The extent to which a special litigation committee appointed

by a corporation's board of directors can exercise its business judgment to cause the dismissal of such a shareholders' derivative suit
remains somewhat unsettled.' This article will address that issue in
the context of the applicable federal and state law, analyze the dis-

cerning trends in the case law, and focus on the use of procedures
that may help protect the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.

Perhaps the most important decision in this context is the Supreme. Court's opinion in Burks v. Lasker. Also significant are thd
post-Burks lower federal court holdings that scrutinize crucial issues not raised before the Supreme Court. Moreover, state court

decisions must be fully digested, particularly in light of the recent
decision by the Delaware Chancery Court in Maldonado v. Flynn.
1. See, e.g., Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d
778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 206 (1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603
F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F.
Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980);
Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Siegal v. Merrick, 84 F.R.D. 106
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Lewis v. Adams, No. 77-266C (N.D. Okla. Nov. 15, 1979); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413
A.2d 1251, subsequently dismissed on res judicata grounds, 417 A.2d 378 (Del. Ch. 1980),
appeal accepted, No. 113-1980 (Del. June 5, 1980) (argued Oct. 16, 1980). See also Bishop,
Derivative Suits Against Bank Directors:New Problems, New Strategies, 97 BANKING L.J.
158 (1980).
2. Compare, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), and Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), with Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F.
Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980), and Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980).
3. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
4. 413 A.2d 1251, subsequently dismissed on res judicata grounds, 417 A.2d 378 (Del.
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Currently on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court,5 the lower
court decision in Maldonado held that under Delaware law the in-

dependent directors are precluded from compelling the dismissal
of a shareholder's derivative action which seeks redress against fel-

low directors for breach of fiduciary duty.6
II.

THE BusImEsS JUDGMENT RULE AND

Burks v. Lasker

As a general proposition, modern corporation laws vest responsibility for the management of a corporation in the board of
directors, which stands in a fiduciary relationship to both the
shareholders and the corporation. These fiduciary responsibilities
require directors to act in good faith and in the corporation's best
interests.7 The business judgment rule complements this standard

of care by generally providing that directors, absent self-dealing or
other personal interest,8 shall be insulated from liability for injury
to the corporation resulting from their decisions if those decisions
"lie within the powers of the corporation and the authority of man-

agement and were reasonably made in good faith and with loyalty
and due care." In other words, under the business judgment rule,
Ch. 1980). See cases cited note 1 supra.
5. See generally Black & Smith, Business Judgment, 13 Rav. S-c. REG. 935, 936 (1980).
.6. 413 A.2d at 1257, 1262; accord, Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp.
713 (E.D. Va. 1980); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
7. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§§ 141(a), 145(a) (1974 & Supp. 1978); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1963). See also Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited,
8 HoFsTR L. REV. 93 (1980); Block & Barton, The Business Judgment Rule as Applied to
Stockholder Proxy Derivative Suits Under the Securities Exchange Act, 8 SEC. REG. L.J.
99 (1980); Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders,and Business
Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 69, 69-77.

8.As stated by one commentator:
[W]here a director or controlling stockholder has a material personal interest in
the outcome of a transaction or is engaged in self-dealing, it will fall to that
individual to prove that the transaction he or she authorized is intrinsically fair
to the corporation and its stockholders. Otherwise stated, where such a personal
interest or self-dealing is shown to exist, a presumption of overreaching arises
that can be overcome only by proof of intrinsic fairness. This has been denominated the intrinsic fairness rule.
Arsht, supra note 7, at 115-16 (citations and footnotes omitted); see Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc.,
629 F.2d 764, 768-70 (2d Cir. 1980); Blake v. National Research Assocs., Inc., 466 F.2d 570,
572 (4th Cir. 1972); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. Ch.
1977). See also Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980).
9. Dent, The Power of Directors to Teminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of
the Derivative Suit, 75 Nw. U.L. Rv.96, 101 (1980). As defined by Fletcher:
It is too well settled to admit of controversy that ordinarily neither the directors
nor other officers of a corporation are liable for mere mistake or errors of judgment, either of law or fact. In other words, directors of a commercial corporation
may take chances, the same kind of chances that a man would take in his own
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directors are not liable for mere errors in judgment not constituting breaches of their fiduciary duty. 0
Included within the authority to manage the corporation is the
directors' determination of whether the corporation shall bring suit
for redress of wrongs it allegedly has suffered."1 Invocation of the
business. Because they are given this wide latitude, the law will not hold directors liable for honest errors, for mistakes of judgment, when they act without
corrupt motive and in good faith, that is, for mistakes which may properly be
classified under the head of honest mistakes. And that is true even though the
errors may be so gross that they may demonstrate the unfitness of the directors
to manage the corporate affairs. The rule is commonly referred to as the "business judgment rule," which generally applies to decisions of executive officers as
well as those of directors. The basis of this rule is the wide latitude that directors of a corporation are given in the management of the affairs of a corporation
provided always that judgment, and that means an honest, unbiased judgment,
is reasonably exercised by them.
3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1039 at 37-38 (rev.
perm. ed. 1975). Recently, one commentator has proffered the following definition of the
business judgment rule:
A corporate transaction that involves no self-dealing by, or other personal interest of, the directors who authorized the transaction will not be enjoined or set
aside for the directors' failure to satisfy the standards that govern a director's
performance of his or her duties, and directors who authorized the transaction
will not be held personally liable for resultant damages, unless:
(1) the directors did not exercise due care to ascertain the relevant and available facts before voting to authorize the transactilon; or
(2) the directors voted to authorize the transaction even
though they did not reasonably believe or could not have reasonably
believed the transaction to be for the best interest of the corporation;
or
(3) in some other way the directors' authorization of the transaction was not in good faith.
Arsht, supra note 7, at 111-12. For a very recent application of the business judgment rule,
see Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., [Current) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,603, at 98,210 (2d
Cir. Aug. 12, 1980).
10. See authorities cited notes 7-9 supra. In Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629,
393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979), the New York Court of Appeals gave its
rationale for the applicability of the business judgment doctrine:
It appears to us that the business judgment doctrine, at least in part, is
grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate what are and must be essentially business judgments. The authority and responsibilities vested in corporate directors both by
statute and decisional law proceed on the assumption that inescapably there can
be no available objective standard by which the correctness of every corporate
decision may be measured, by the courts or otherwise. Even if that were not the
case, by definition the responsibility for business judgments must rest with the
corporate directors; their individual capabilities and experience peculiarly qualify them for the discharge of that responsibility. Thus, absent evidence of bad
faith or fraud (of which there is none here) the courts must and properly should
respect their determinations.
11. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
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business judgment rule as a ground for the directors' refusal to
bring suit or their active opposition to a derivative action will warrant, under some circumstances, dismissal of the action.' Until recently, this principle was primarily applied when the alleged
wrongdoers were not affiliated with the corporation. Under such
circumstances, directors could be expected to judge impartially the
benefits and detriments of bringing suit.' s For example, Mr. Justice Brandeis, addressing the decision by the board of directors of
a corporation not to bring an antitrust action against a third party,
remarked:
Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts
a cause of action for damages is, like other business questions,
ordinarily a matter of internal management and is left to the
discretion of the directors, in the absence of instruction by vote
of the shareholders. Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion intra vires the corporation, except where the directors
are guilty of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or
where they stand in a dual relation which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment ....

As Mr. Justice Brandeis implied, the rule generally has not been
invoked if the directors are implicated in the alleged wrong. 1" Re12. See, e.g., id.; Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Steinberg
v. Hardy, 90 F. Supp. 167, 169 (D. Conn. 1950); Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14, 46, 91 N.E.

683, 694 (1910); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 378, 329 N.E.2d 180, 185-86, 368 N.Y.S.2d
497, 504-05 (1975); Passmore v. Allentown & Reading Traction Co., 267 Pa. 356, 358-59, 110
A. 240, 241 (1920); 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
5822 at 145 (rev. perm. ed. 1975); Dent, supra note 9, at 98.

13. See Dent, supra note 9, at 98.
14. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. at 263-64 (emphasis

added).
15. Id.; see Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1881); Ash v. International
Business Machs., Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 493 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966);
Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912, 921-22 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915
(1963); Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 176, 240 P.2d 421, 427 (1952); Swenson v.
Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 106-07, 250 S.E.2d 279, 298 (1978).
As an analogy, before commencing suit, a shareholder must make a demand on the

board of directors that it bring suit to seek redress, unless such a demand would be futile.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 23.1:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be as-

serted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege... with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from
the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or
members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making
the effort.
Such a demand on the board has been held to be futile if the alleged wrongdoers constitute
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cently, however, several courts have applied the rule when a duly
appointed special litigation committee composed of directors not
involved in the alleged wrong has elected not to bring suit.1 The
starting point in this analysis is the Supreme Court's fairly recent
decision in Burks v. Lasker.17
The issue in Burks was whether a quorum of four statutorily
disinterested directors within the meaning of the Investment Company Act 18 could terminate a shareholders' derivative suit against
fellow directors on the basis that, in the exercise of their good faith
business judgment, the continuation of the litigation was not in the
company's best interests.1 9 Rather than directly answering this inquiry, the Supreme Court promulgated a two-prong test: (1)
whether the applicable state law allows the disinterested directors
to terminate a shareholders' derivative suit, and (2) whether such a
state rule is consistent with the policies underlying the federal securities laws.20
a majority of the board. See, e.g., Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 841 (1964) (applying Virginia law); Orlando Orange Groves Co.
v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 316, 144 So. 674, 678 (1932); Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 347 111.App.
261, 279, 106 N.E.2d 848, 856 (1952); Eston v. Argus, 328 Mich. 554, 556, 44 N.W.2d 154, 155
(1950); Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 Mo. 185, 192, 30 S.W.2d 976, 979 (1930); Barr v. Wackman,
36 N.Y.2d 371, 379, 329 N.E.2d 180, 186, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 505 (1975); H. HENN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 365 (2d ed. 1970); N.
LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 105 (2d ed. 1971); Dent, supra note 9, at 99; Note, The
Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Suits, 44 U. CH. L. Rev.
168, 176 (1976):
When a majority of the directors have engaged in fraud or self-dealing, such
as appropriating a corporate opportunity, courts have generally not required demand. But when a majority of the directors are accused of approving or passively acquiescing in an allegedly injurious transaction, courts are split on
whether demand should be required.
See also text accompanying note 57 infra.
16. See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979); Abbey v. Control Data
Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
17. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19), -10 (1976).
19. 441 U.S. at 473-74. The disinterested directors were appointed by the board of directors of the defendant fund and were not named as defendants.
20. Id. at 480, 486. Although the Court's decision promulgated this standard within the
context of the Investment Company Act, subsequent lower court decisions have applied it
irrespective of the federal securities act alleged to have been violated. See cases cited note 1
supra. Unlike the other securities acts, however, the Investment Company Act requires that
at least forty percent of the directors of such companies be "independent." See 15 U.S.C. §§
80a-2(a)(19), -10 (1976); 441 U.S. at 482. As noted by the Burks Court: "Congress' purpose
in structuring the Act as it did is clear. It was 'designed to place the unaffiliated directors in
the role of "independent watchdogs."'
IId. at 484 (quoting Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d
402, 406 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977)). Nevertheless, the Second Circuit in
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The Court's opinion, however, left unresolved a number of issues. For example, what constitutes, for purposes other than the
Investment Company Act, a "disinterested" director? Will courts
inquire into the "reasonableness" of the directors' determination
to bar a shareholders' derivative suit? May less than a quorum of
directors properly act for the corporate entity for these purposes?
Of course, prior to the Court's opinion in Burks, a number of
lower federal courts rendered decisions on this subject, generally
holding that a good faith decision by a special litigation committee
to bar a shareholders' derivative suit against fellow directors is permitted under the business judgment rule. Decisions reflecting this
rationale include Rosengarten v. InternationalTelephone & Telegraph Corp.21 and Gall v. Exxon Corp.2 In both of these decisions,
it is interesting to note that the plaintiffs were granted limited discovery to test the bona fides and independence of the special litigation committee members.' 8 In subsequent cases, if the plaintiff
has pleaded bad faith or lack of independence on the part of the
members of the committee, a number of courts have similarly permitted limited discovery.s2
Burks held that "disinterested directors of an investment company do not have the power to
foreclose the continuation of nonfrivolous litigation brought by shareholders against majority directors for breach of their fiduciary duties." Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d
Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
For additional commentary on Burks, see Bishop, supra note 1, at 161-62; Block &
Barton, supra note 7, at 102; Dent, supra note 9, at 104-05; Gammon, Derivative Suits, 12
Rev. Szc. REo. 887, 887-91 (1979). See generally Note, Mutual Fund Independent Directors: Putting a Leash on the Watchdogs, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 568 (1979).
21. 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
22. 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). As stated by the court in Gall:
It is clear that absent allegations of fraud, collusion, self-interest, dishonesty or
other misconduct of a breach of trust nature, and absent allegations that the
business judgment exercised was grossly unsound, the court should not at the
instigation of a single shareholder interfere with the judgment of the Corporate
officers.
Id. at 516. But see Nussbacher v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 444 F. Supp. 973, 977 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) ("It is inconceivable that directors who participated in and allegedly approved of the
transaction under attack can be said to have exercised unbiased business judgment in declining suit based on that very transaction."); Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 250
S.E.2d 279 (1978) (court refused to apply business judgment rule to determination made by
special litigation committee when defendant directors influenced members of the
committee).
23. See 466 F. Supp. at 823; 418 F. Supp. at 520 ("Plaintiff must be given an opportunity to test the bona fides and independence of the Special Committee through discovery
and, if necessary, at a plenary hearing.").
24. See, e.g., Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1980); Lewis v. Anderson, 615
F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 687 (E.D. Mich. 1980);
Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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Although the result reached in cases like Rosengarten and
Gall may well be the same after Burks, it is clear that Burks' twoprong analysis must now be employed. One pre-Burks decision,
however, may still remain good law. In Miller v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.,"5 the complaint in a shareholders' deriv-

ative action alleged that the company had neglected to collect a
$1.5 million debt owed by the Democratic National Committee.'
Holding that the business judgment rule was unavailable under
New York law, the court rested its decision on the premise that, as
alleged in the complaint, the failure of the directors to collect the
debt may itself have constituted a continuing illegal act. Atypical
of the Burks scenario was the presence in Miller of an allegation
that the directors' decision not to prosecute the claim was itself an
7
illegal act.'

III. Burks'

PROGENY IN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS

The following discussion analyzes the relevant federal and
state court decisions on the authority of special litigation committees to dismiss shareholder derivative suits against fellow directors.
Note that the first prong of Burks' two-prong analysis may require
a federal court, in essence, to sit as a state court.'8 Only if relevant
state law permits director dismissal of the derivative suit will a
federal court turn to the second prong. 9 If, however, dismissal is
sought in state court, the only inquiry is whether applicable state
law authorizes such dismissal.80
A.

Federal Court Decisions

After Burks, a number of federal courts have considered the
25. 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
26. Id. at 761.
27. Id. at 762. The district courts in Gall and Rosengarten expressly distinguished
Miller on this basis. See 466 F. Supp. at 824 n.8; 418 F. Supp. at 518.
28. E.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1979); see notes 72-75 and accompanying text infra.
29. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 480-81. Burks signified, as have other recent cases,
that the degree of investor protection under the federal securities laws will depend in large
part on state law. Thus, the Court remarked: "Congress has never indicated that the entire
corpus of state corporate law is to be replaced simply because a plaintiff's cause of action is
based upon a federal statute." Id. at 478. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
479 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). See generally Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 263 (1980).
30. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47
N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
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authority of special litigation committees to dismiss shareholder
derivative suits. For example, in Abbey v. Control Data Corp.,3 1
shareholders brought a derivative action to recover $1.3 million
from seven senior officers and directors after the corporation pled
guilty to making illegal payments to certain foreign entities. In
particular, the suit charged violations of sections 13(a) and 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act 3 2 by the corporation's failure to disclose the illegal payments.3 After conducting its investigation, a
special litigation committee composed of seven outside directors,
who were appointed by their fellow directors, concluded that the
derivative suit was not in the corporation's best interests."4 The
district court subsequently granted summary judgment for the corporation.85 Employing Burks' two-prong analysis, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Delaware law authorizes dismissal of
a shareholders' derivative suit if the determination by the outside
directors was reasonable and in good faith," and that, in this case,
the plaintiff's federal law claims were at best weak.3 7 In an accompanying footnote, however, the court implied that, in certain instances, the strength of the federal policy involved may preclude
committee dismissal of the plaintiff's federal claims.38
Relying on both Burks and Abbey, the Ninth Circuit reached a
like result in Lewis v. Anderson,"' with the exception that the
Lewis court reserved for trial the issue whether the committee did,
in fact, exercise good faith business judgment. 40 Interestingly, one
claim of the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated section
31. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78h (1976).
33. 603 F.2d at 726.
34. Id. at 727.
35. Id.
36. "As a matter of Delaware law, we agree with the district court that the rule apparently applies to any reasonable good faith determination by an independent board of directors that the derivative action is not in the best interests of the corporation." Id. at 730.
37. Id. at 731-32. The Abbey court observed that the plaintiff had failed to show
"transactional causation." See notes 59-62 and accompanying text infra.
38. See 603 F.2d at 728 n.4. See also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 487 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("[I]t seems to me that a situation could very well exist where state law conflicts
with federal policy."); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 690 (E.D. Mich. 1980)
([T]here may be cases in which a business judgment dismissal of claims that directors have
violated the proxy solicitation rules is not consistent with the policy of full disclosure which
is necessary for the ultimate goal of shareholder protection . . . ."). But see 441 U.S. at 487
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I cannot agree with the implications in the
Court's opinion . . . that there is any danger that state law will conflict with federal
policy.").
39. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 206 (1980).
40. Id. at 780.
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10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act"1 by trading on inside information.4' The court's dismissal of this claim raises important policy considerations. Even in light of the Supreme Court's restrictive
decisions in the securities law area, 3 including Chiarellav. United
States," there can be little question that the proscription against
trading on inside information by those who owe a fiduciary duty to
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
42. 615 F.2d at 783-84.
43. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980) (scienter required in SEC injunctive
actions under § 10(b) of Exchange Act, rule lob-5 thereunder, and § 17(a)(1) of Securities
Act); Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980) (no duty to disclose under section
10(b) from mere possession of nonpublic market information); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S.Ct. 242 (1979) (no implied private right of action under § 206 of
the Investment Advisers Act; limited implied private right of action under § 215); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979) (no implied private right of action under §
17(a) of the Exchange Act); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559
(1979) (interest in noncontributory, compulsory pension plan not "security" subject to regulation under Securities Acts); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1978) (limiting SEC's
right to suspend summarily trading in registered securities for successive 10-day periods);
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) (breach of fiduciary duty, without manipulation or deception, not actionable under § 10(b) of Exchange Act and rule 10b5); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 28 (1977) (defeated tender offeror has no
standing to bring implied private right of action for damages under § 14(e) of Exchange
Act); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (scienter required in private
damage actions under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (only purchasers and sellers have standing to bring implied private
cause of action for damages under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5). See generally Lowenfels, Recent
Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65
GEo. L.J. 891 (1977); Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action under Federal Law, 55
NOTrRE DAME LAW. 33 (1979). With respect to § 10(b), Justice Blackmun, dissenting in
Chiarellastated: "The Court continues to pursue a course, chartered in certain recent decisions, designed to transform § 10(b) from an internationally elastic 'catchall' provision to
one that catches relatively little of the misbehavior that all too often makes investment in
securities a needlessly risky business for the uninitiated investor." 100 S. Ct. at 1123-24
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
On occasions, however, the Court has departed from this restrictive approach. See, e.g.,
Steadman v. SEC, [Current] FED. Sxc. L. RRP. (CCH) 97,878 (U.S. 1981) (SEC correctly
employed preponderance of the evidence standard in administrative proceeding); Rubin v.
United States, 101 S. Ct. 698 (1981) (pledge of stock as collateral for a loan is an "offer or
sale" of a security under § 17(a) of the Securities Act); Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980)
(scienter not required in SEC injunctive actions under § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3) of Securities
Act); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979) (reach of § 17(a) of Securities Act extends beyond actual purchasers and sellers and encompasses aftermarket trading frauds).
See generally Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (implication of private
right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972). For a discussion of
the possible ramifications of Aaron, Naftalin, and Steadman, see Steinberg, SEC and Other
Permanent Injunction-Standards for Their Imposition, Modification, and Dissolution,
66 CORNELL L. REv. 27 (1980); Steinberg, Steadman v.SEC-Its Implications and Significance, 6 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1981); Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
After Naftalin and Redington, 68 Gzo.L.J. 163 (1979).
44. 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980).
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shareholders and the corporation remains a fundamental tenet underlying the objectives of the federal securities acts of protecting
the investing public and the integrity of the marketplace."" To allow dismissal of such claims without permitting the opportunity
for redress arguably runs contrary to these objectives."'
45. The Chiarella Court recognized:
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have established that silence in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10(b) despite the absence of statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But such liability is
premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction. Application of a duty to disclose prior to
trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the
shareholder's welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material nonpublic information.
Id. at 1115. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). In the aftermath of Chiarella, the
SEC, to police, inter alia, insider and "tippee" trading in connection with tender offers,
promulgated rule 14e-3. Generally speaking, this rule recognizes a duty under the Williams
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), either to disclose information or to abstain from trading on the information. The rule also contains a broad "antitipping" proscription. According to the SEC, the rule "is necessary and appropriate in the
public interest and for the protection of investors because of the current abuses in tender
offer practices and the detrimental effects which such trading has on shareholders and securities markets in the context of tender offers." 80-176 SEC NEws DiG. 1 (Sept. 9, 1980).
See Securities Act Release No. 33-6239, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,646 (Sept.
4, 1980); SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 569, at A-2 to A-4 (Sept. 10, 1980).
46. Quoting approvingly from Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), the Supreme
Court in Chiarella stated that the obligation to disclose or abstain from trading derives
from
[ain affirmative duty to disclose material information[,] [which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently held that insiders:
must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position
but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known,
would affect their investment judgment.
100 S.Ct. at 1114 (quoting 40 S.E.C. at 911). See Brodsky, Terminationof Derivative Suits
by Directors, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 16, 1980, at 1.
Another important question is whether a special litigation committee may, consistently
with federal policy, terminate a derivative action alleging violations of § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. By its terms, § 16(b) authorizes shareholders, under certain circumstances, to sue derivatively to enforce the corporation's right to recover insiders' short-swing
profits. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976); see Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 689 (E.D.
Mich. 1980) (In ordering dismissal under § 14(a), the court noted that "[tihis is in sharp
contrast to § 16(b) . . . [which] specifically authorizes shareholder suits to be instituted if
the board of directors fails or refuses to bring the suit .... ");Grynberg v. Farmer, [1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,683 (D. Colo. Oct. 8, 1980) (Federal district
court rejected the special litigation committee's determination and denied a motion for summary judgment in a suit based on violations of § 16(b) on the grounds that the members of
the committee were biased, that the committee failed to engage independent counsel, and
that one member of the committee was counsel to a defendant-director).
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Equally disconcerting is the Lewis court's implicit approval of
the special litigation committee's composition, which consisted of
two outside directors and one director who was a named defendant
but who did not personally benefit from the challenged transaction.4 7 The potential danger of using named defendants to dismiss
shareholder derivative suits is illustrated by the Second Circuit's
decision in Galef v. Alexander."' In Galef, the derivative action alleged that all fifteen directors had violated the proxy prohibitions
of the Securities Exchange Act. Those defendant directors who did
not benefit from the transaction 49 determined that the suit was not
in the corporation's best interests and sought dismissal. In holding
that dismissal of the suit was inappropriate, the Second Circuit
concluded that the defendant directors who sought dismissal stood
in a "dual relation" which prevented an unbiased exercise of judgment.50 In reaching this conclusion, the court seemed to imply that
"disinterested" within the "dual relation" context must signify, at
a minimum, that the disinterested directors did not authorize or
approve the challenged transaction and were not named as defendants in the lawsuit.5 " Thus, the court asserted, one could not expect that directors who had participated in or approved of the
transaction, or who were themselves subject to personal liability,
whether the shareholders' derivative
would determine impartially
52
suit was warranted.
Viewing Lewis and Galef in conjunction, one can reconcile the
two decisions only on the basis that the defendant director in
Lewis composed only a minority of the special litigation committee. Hence, dismissal of the derivative suit would have occurred
regardless of the defendant director's appointment to the committee. Whether this distinction between these two cases is viable remains to be seen. Unfortunately, the court in Lewis never focused
47. 615 F.2d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1979).
48. 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
49. The complaint alleged that proxy statements, seeking shareholder approval of stock

option plans benefiting various directors, failed to meet the disclosure requirements of §
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. Id. at 53.
50. Id. at 60 (quoting United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S.
261, 264 (1917)). Distinguishing United Copper from the case at bar, the Galef court noted
that "[iun each case, the court has indeed allowed directors to preclude pursuit of a corpo-

rate claim, but in each the directors who made such a determination were not alleged to
have authorized or approved the challenged transaction, and they were not made defendants
in the lawsuit." 615 F.2d at 60.
51. 615 F.2d at 60, 61.

52. Id. at 61.

1980]

SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES

on the issue. 3
In Galef, the Second Circuit also relied on the strong federal
policies underlying claims based on the federal proxy provisions
and on the defendant directors' participation in the alleged proxy
violation. 4 Turning to this point, the court observed that management's role in adequately educating the shareholder to enable him
to vote intelligently is unique. Because directors are fiduciaries,
have the greatest access to factual corporate information, and are
most knowledgeable about the corporation's long-range plans,
shareholders naturally rely heavily on their representations. Because of such reliance, the objective of section 14(a),55 that communications from management be full and fair as to all material facts,
is a crucial one." According to the court, the achievement of this
goal:
would quite clearly be frustrated if a director who was made a
defendant in a derivative action for providing inadequate information in connection with a proxy solicitation were permitted to
cause the dismissal of that action simply on the basis of his
judgment that its pursuit was not in the best interests of the
corporation. The very premises which give life to a derivative
right of action to enforce § 14(a) must save it from a premature
death. In short, we conclude that to the extent that a complaint
states claims against directors under § 14(a) upon which relief
may be granted, federal policy prevents the summary dismissal
of those claims pursuant to the business judgment of those de53. See 615 F.2d at 783.
54. 615 F.2d at 62-66.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
56. Id. at 63-64; see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964). See generally
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
910 (1973), in which the Second Circuit spoke of management's responsibilities in the tender
offer context:
By reason of the special relationship between them, shareholders are likely to
rely heavily upon the representations of corporate insiders when the
shareholders find themselves in the midst of a battle for control. Corporate insiders therefore have a special responsibility to be meticulous and precise in
their representations to shareholders.
Id. at 364-65. On this point, see Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. Rzv. 901, 904-05 (1979). The staff of the SEC Division of
Corporation Finance recently issued its long-awaited report on corporate accountability.
The purpose of the staff report, in short, is to examine "the extent to which corporate governance and accountability mechanisms protect the interests of shareholders." SEC DIVISION
OF CORPORATION FINANCE, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 32 (1980). For a
discussion of the staff's recommendations and conclusions, see SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
No. 5, at A-5 to A-7 (Sept. 10, 1980); Vandergrift, The SEC Corporate Accountability Report, Legal Times (Wash.), Oct. 20, 1980, at 20, col. 1.
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fendant directors.5 7

At first glance, it may appear that the court's rationale in
Galef extends to any shareholders' derivative suit alleging section
14(a) violations by defendant directors. In other words, the federal
policies in favor of disclosure are so vital that any state rule that
allows dismissal in such circumstances necessarily conflicts with

such policies.5 8 An important limitation in the court's language,
however, is that a claim under section 14(a) must be one "upon

which relief may be granted."5

As interpreted by the courts,

"transactional causation" is an essential element of a section 14(a)

cause of action, 60 signifying that "[tihe harm to plaintiff-shareholders must have resulted from the corporate transactions which
were authorized as a result of the false or misleading proxy solicitations."6 1 As applied to the facts in Galef, the defendant directors
allegedly failed to disclose material facts when securing shareholder approval of stock option plans that inured to the direct
benefit of certain recipient-directors, and when subsequently seeking the election of those directors. In this context, Galef may stand
for the proposition that when there is a direct link between the
alleged nondisclosures and the shareholder vote, the federal policies embodied in section 14(a)" preclude dismissal of the deriva57. 615 F.2d at 63-64. In making this statement, the court pointed out that its holding
did not mean that a plaintiff could evade an otherwise available business judgment dismissal merely by asserting claims against all of the directors under § 14(a). The court opined
that, depending on the facts of each particular case, a motion to dismiss under FED. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) or a motion for summary judgment under id. 56, would be appropriate. 615 F.2d
at 66.
The Galef court also analogized to the demand requirement, noting that the type of
cases "in which the plaintiff stockholder has made a demand on the directors which has
been rejected, are structurally closer to the case at hand, because the business decision not
to have the corporation's claim pursued has been made and is known, and the question is
whether that decision will be treated as definitive." Id. at 60. For a discussion of this analogy, see Dent, supra note 9, at 114-17; Brodsky, Business Judgment Rule, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20,
1980, at 1. See generally notes 7-15 and accompanying text supra.
58. See 615 F.2d at 63, 64.
59. Id. at 64; see note 57 supra.
60. See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 1979); Weisberg
v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1600 (1980);
In re Tenneco Sec. Litigation, 449 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Limmer v. General Tel. &
Elecs. Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,111 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Lewis v. Elam, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,013
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
61. Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d at 732; accord, cases cited note 60 supra.
62. See 615 F.2d at 63-64. In Galef, the shareholders also sought to void the 1974-1976
election of directors, alleging inadequate disclosure of certain directors' remuneration from
the stock option grants. Because the suit sought, inter alia, to set aside the elections on

1980]

SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES

tive suit by defendant directors.
In Galef, the Second Circuit left unresolved the question
whether it would contravene federal policy for (1) nondefendant
directors or (2) a committee composed of disinterested nondirectors to authorize, if state law allowed, the termination of a shareholders' derivative suit alleging violations of the proxy provisions. 6 s
The federal district court's opinion in Maldonado v. Flynn" sheds
some light on the question. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that
the proxy materials used to secure the election of Zapata Corporation's board of directors were false and misleading in failing to disclose the circumstances surrounding modification of a stock option
plan." In response to this suit and two related actions, Zapata's
board formed an "independent investigation committee" composed
of two nondefendant directors who were appointed to the board
after the derivative suits had commenced. After retaining special
counsel to assist it, the committee conducted a three-month investigation, which included examining thousands of documents and
conducting numerous interviews. In its report, the committee ultimately determined that the three actions were not in the corporation's best interest, for twelve specified reasons. Zapata thereupon
moved to dismiss Maldonado's complaint."
Applying Burks, the district court held that an independent
account of the alleged nondisclosures, the court deemed the causation requirement satisfied.
Id. at 65-66 (relying on Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1600 (1980)).
63. 615 F.2d at 64 n.20.
64. 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
65. Id. at 278. For an additional recital of the facts, see Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d
1251, 1254-55, subsequently dismissed on res judicata grounds, 417 A.2d 378 (Del. Ch.),
appeal accepted, No. 113-1980 (Del. June 5, 1980) (argued Oct. 16, 1980).
The first Maldonado case, Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979), also a
shareholder's derivative suit, involved allegations that §§ 10(b) and 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act were violated in the administration of the corporation's stock option plan for
key employees of Zapata and its subsidiaries. The Second Circuit found the claim under §
10(b) to be without merit, reasoning that "[s]ince the amendments [modifying the stock
option plan] were thus validly enacted by a vote of disinterested board members who had
been fully informed of all material facts, their knowledge was attributable to the Corporation and no 'deception' occurred within the meaning of Rule 10b-5." Id. at 795. For a more
extensive discussion on this aspect of Maldonado, see Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 29.
With respect to the section 14(a) claim, which alleged that the proxy statements soliciting
votes for the election of Zapata's directors were materially false and misleading, the Second
Circuit remanded, reasoning that a reasonable shareholder could have considered the information important. 597 F.2d at 796.98. Thereafter, the corporation formed a special litigation committee consisting of two newly appointed directors who, after conducting an investigation, recommended that the derivative action be terminated. 485 F. Supp. at 278.
66. See authorities cited note 65 supra.
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committee of disinterested nondefendant directors could foreclose
the bringing of a shareholder's derivative suit against corporate directors based on federal proxy claims if the applicable state law
permitted such termination and if such dismissal was not inconsis67
tent with the policies underlying the federal proxy provisions.
Answering both questions in the affirmative, the court concluded
that "if a committee of independent, personally disinterested directors of Zapata has determined in good faith that in its business
judgment the continuation of this action is not in the best interests
of the corporation, the action must be dismissed."'
It is significant that the district court reached its decision notwithstanding that the directors comprising the special investigation committee (1) were not elected by the shareholders, but were
appointed by the defendant directors, (2) were appointed for the
sole purpose of serving on the committee, i.e., to exercise their business judgment about the derivative litigation, and (3) had some
prior, although not substantial, contacts with certain of the defendant directors. In sum, the logic of the court's decision may well
have been based on such factors as the thorough investigative and
procedural record developed by the committee, the apparent disinterestedness of the committee's members in the activities they investigated, and the board's delegation of binding authority (not
subject to the board's review) to the committee to investigate and
ultimately to determine whether the litigation was in the corporation's best interests."e
B. State Court Decisions
Under the first prong of the Burks standard, a federal court is.
to determine whether the applicable state law permits the disinterested directors to terminate a shareholder's derivative suit against
67. 485 F. Supp. at 278.
68. Id. at 282.
69. Id. at 282-86. The law firm of one of the newly appointed directors was hired by the

corporation as independent counsel for purposes of the investigation. The plaintiff argued
that this appointment showed a lack of independence. The court disposed of this contention
as "a non sequitur and hardly worthy of comment." Id. at 283. As pointed out later in this
article, however, the meaning of independence should be fairly narrowly construed. Contrary to the court's holding, a plausible argument can be made that there exists, at the least,
an appearance of impropriety when the newly appointed director, who is selected by the
defendant directors, uses his law firm as independent counsel. The generaton of fees induced by such business may prompt, albeit unintentionally, a disposition in favor of the
defendants. Further, if the director and his law firm recommend termination, this may well
prompt other corporate director defendants to seek their services. See text accompanying
notes 125-28 infra.
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their fellow directors.7 In many situations, however, the applicable
state law may be unresolved, often because no decision of a high
court of the state is squarely on point.7 1 In such instances, the federal court, in effect, will be "sitting as a state court. ' 7 2 Assuming

this role, both the federal district court in Maldonado and the
Eighth Circuit in Abbey construed Delaware law to allow such dismissal. 73 Furthermore, until the decision by the Delaware Court of
Chancery in Maldonado v. Flynn, no federal court had decided
that any state law precluded disinterested nondefendant directors
from barring a shareholders' derivative action against fellow
directors."'
It is in this context that the decision by the Court of Chancery
in Maldonado, currently on appeal to the Delaware Supreme
Court 7 6 becomes so significant. Adoption of the rationale of the

Court of Chancery by the Delaware Supreme Court and other state
and federal tribunals77 would effectively preclude director dismissal of shareholder derivative suits against fellow directors.
The facts alleged in Maldonado showed that the Zapata Corporation's board of directors accelerated the exercise date of their
stock options to avoid substantial additional federal income tax liability. This increased tax liability was due to an anticipated increase in the price of Zapata's stock after the announcement of an
70. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 480, 486; notes 19-20 and accompanying text
supra.
71. See, e.g., Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 61 (2d Cir. 1980); Lewis v. Anderson, 615
F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1979).
72. See Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d at 781. See generally Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967), in which the Court stated:
[T]he State's highest court is the best authority on its own law. If there be no
decision by that court then federal authorities must apply what they find to be
the state law after giving "proper regard" to relevant rulings of other courts of
the State. In this respect, it may be said to be in effect, sitting as a state court.
Id. at 465. See also Berhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956).
73. See Abbey, 603 F.2d at 729; Maldonado, 485 F. Supp. at 278-80.
74. 413 A.2d 1251, subsequently dismissed on res judicata grounds, 417 A.2d 378 (Del.
Ch.), appeal accepted, No. 113-1980 (Del. June 5, 1980) (argued Oct. 16, 1980).
75. See, e.g., Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980) (result unclear under Ohio
law); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979) (dismissal proper under California
law); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979) (dismissal proper under
Delaware law); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (dismissal proper
under Michigan law).
76. 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980); see Black & Smith, supra note 5, at 936.
77. Subsequent to the Delaware Court of Chancery's opinion in Maldonado, two federal
cases have applied Maldonado's rationale to preclude dismissal under relevant state law.
Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980) (Virginia law);
Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (Delaware law); see notes 86-97
and accompanying text infra.
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issuer tender offer. 8 In a stockholder's derivative action, Maldonado alleged that the directors' conduct in moving up their option
exercise dates constituted a breach of fiduciary duty and deprived
Zapata of a federal tax deduction. After conducting an investigation and concluding that the suit was not in the corporation's best
interests, the special litigation committee instructed Zapata's
counsel to seek dismissal.7
In denying Zapata's motion, the Court of Chancery concluded
that, under well established Delaware law, the directors of a corporation cannot bar a pending shareholder's derivative action that
requests relief for an apparent breach of fiduciary duty, by merely
reviewing the action and rendering a business judgment that it is
contrary to the corporation's best interests.80 According to the
court, the cases cited by Zapata showed only that a shareholder
may be denied standing to bring suit on behalf of the corporation
if he has failed to make a proper demand, assuming one is necessary, or if he endeavors to declare a right not legally assertable by
the corporation, or if the suit alleges a purely legal right of action
against an extracorporate defendant without any claim that the
directors have acted improperly.8 1 From prior Delaware cases, the
Court of Chancery reasoned that the business judgment rule provides only a "shield" with which directors may protect their decisions from shareholder attack; nothing in the rule gives directors
any independent power to bar a derivative suit against fellow directors to rectify an apparent breach of fiduciary duty.8 Contrary
to Zapata's assertion that a shareholder's right to bring suit is always subordinate to that of the corporation and therefore subject
to a corporate decision to bar its continuance, the court asserted
78. 413 A.2d at 1254.
79. Id. at 1255; see Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
80. 413 A.2d at 1257. As the court pointed out, Maldonado's complaint did

not attack as improper the 1979 decision of the Committee to seek the dismissal
of this litigation, which was probably an exercise of business judgment....
Rather Maldonado is attacking the 1974 decision of the directors to accelerate
the option dates as being in bad faith or in breach of the directors' fiduciary

duties.
Id. at 1259. Two recent Texas state court decisions rejected attempts by defendants to dismiss derivative suits on the basis of recommendations of the board of directors. Sonics Int'l,
Inc. v. Dorchester Enterprises, Inc., 593 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Zauber v. Murray
Say. Ass'n, 591 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).

81. Id. at 1260. For a discussion of these principles, see notes 7-15, 57 and accompanying text supra.
82. 413 A.2d at 1257. The court relied particularly on Sohland v. Baker, 141 A. 277,

281-82 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1927), concluding that "standing alone," Sohland was "probably sufficient ground to deny Zapata's motions." 413 A.2d at 1261.
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that "[a]ggrieved shareholders of Delaware corporations ought to
be able to expect that an impartial tribunal, and not a committee
appointed by the alleged wrongdoers, will decide whether a stockholder's derivative suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty has any
merit."83 In summary, the court concluded:
[A]n analysis of the business judgment rule shows that while it
is a limitation on liability and ordinarily protects corporate directors when they, in good faith, decide not to pursue a remedy
on behalf of the corporation, it is not an independent grant of
authority to the directors to dismiss derivative suits. Under settled Delaware law the directors do not have the right to compel
the dismissal of a derivative suit brought by a stockholder to
rectify an apparent breach of fiduciary duty by the directors to
the corporation and its stockholders after the directors have refused to institute legal proceedings, because the stockholder
then possesses an independent right to redress the wrong."
As a final caveat, the Delaware court commented that even if
the business judgment rule were relevant to authorize such dismissal of shareholder derivative suits, principles of fairness and fiduciary duty require that the defendant directors who appointed the
members of the investigative committee should bear the burden of
proving the independence of the committee. 85
83. 413 A.2d at 1263 (citing Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980)).
84. 413 A.2d at 1262. On this point, the court also stated:
The individual right of the stockholder to protect his interests and the interests
of his corporation by bringing a derivative suit against the directors of the corporation for breach of fiduciary duty is not diminished because the suit may be
commenced by the stockholder only if the corporation will not assert the right.
The stockholder's right to litigate is secondary to the corporate right to bring
suit only for so long as the corporation has not decided to refuse to bring suit.
Once the corporation refuses, or impliedly refuses, to assert an apparently valid
claim, involving a breach of fiduciary duty by the corporate directors, the stockholder is vested with a primary and independent right to redress the wrong by
bringing a derivative suit.
Id. at 1262-63. Some commentators have criticized the Court of Chancery's decision. See,
e.g., Frome, Business-JudgmentRule and Maldonado v. Flynn, N.Y.L.J., June 16, 1980, at
1, col. 1. But see Bernstein, Business-Judgment Rule Circumscribed, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23,
1980, at 1, col. 1 ("[Il]egal niceties aside, the Delaware Maldonado interpretation is sound
from the standpoint of plain fairness"). See also Hinsey, Maldonado (N.Y.) v. Maldonado
(DE): Which Prevails, Legal Times (Wash.), Aug. 4, 1980, at 18, col. 1.
85. 413 A.2d at 1263; see Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 693 (E.D. Mich.
1980) ("The court must finally consider whether the defendants have established, as a matter of law, that the Special Litigation Committee acted independently and in good faith in
recommending that the derivative claims be dismissed relative to all defendants.");
Grynberg v. Farmer, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,683 at 98,586 (D.
Colo. Oct. 8, 1980) (court left open whether such burden of proof "requires proof by a mere
preponderance, by clear and convincing evidence, or by some other standard .... "). But
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Maldonado's impact has already been felt. In another shareholders' derivative suit against Zapata Corporation, Maher v.
Zapata Corp.,8e violations of both federal and state law were alleged.87 Relying on the opinion of the Court of Chancery, the federal district court held that under the first prong of Burks, Delaware law precludes directors or a committee thereof from
dismissing shareholder derivative suits brought against fellow directors for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty.88 Although a federal
case, Maher is important because its holding was predicated entirely on the application of state law.89 Equally significant is that
even though not bound by the decision of the Court of Chancery,"
the Maher court was "convinced" that the Delaware Supreme
Court would adopt the "thorough well-reasoned analysis" of the
Maldonado court.91
Although not ruling on the issue, the Maher court also expressed concern about whether the Zapata committee had made its
determination that the suit was not in the corporation's best interests in good faith and within the bounds of reason." The court
queried whether the committee had based its determination more
on a "rationalization" than on an investigation, particularly because the alleged wrongdoers had appointed the committee.9 Acknowledging that, assuming the business judgment rule were applicable, it must respect the committee's decision if reasonable, the
court nevertheless questioned the committee's balancing of the various factors involved in its decisionmaking process."
In another recent federal district court case, Judge Merhige,
see Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).

In regard to Maldonado's long-term effect on the business judgment rule, note that the
Delaware Supreme Court has accepted an appeal from the Court of Chancery's initial
landmark decision.
86. 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
87. Id. at 349, 350.
88. Id. at 351-53.
89. "Since Delaware law does not permit independent directors to terminate a derivative action against other board members, this Court need not address whether the state law
rule of dismissal is consistent with the policies of the federal securities act. . . ." Id. at 353.
90. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) ("[U]nder some conditions, federal authority may not be bound even by an intermediate state appellate court
ruling .. ").See also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956);
note 72 and accompanying text supra.
91. 490 F. Supp. at 353.
92. Id. at 354.
93. Id.
94. Id. See also Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 n.21 (3d Cir.
1978).
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relying directly on the Maldonado decision of the Delaware Court
of Chancery, held that under Virginia law, the business judgment
rule is "irrelevant" to a special litigation committee's determination that a shareholders' derivative suit against fellow directors
should be barred.9 5 Under Virginia law, Judge Merhige reasoned, a
stockholder's independent right to institute suit on behalf of the

corporation in such cases is conditioned only on a showing that a
demand has been made upon the directors or that circumstances
excuse such a demand from being made. 6 Thus, "Virginia law does
not permit directors, interested or disinterested, to effect the dismissal of a derivative suit against a corporation and its directors,
based simply on their business judgment that the suit is contrary

to the corporation's best interests." 97
A New York Court of Appeals decision, Auerbach v. Ben-

nett,98 indicates that New York law apparently conflicts with the

decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery in Maldonado. Decided before Maldonado, Auerbach recognizes the propriety of a
committee composed of disinterested directors, appointed by the
board, to exercise its business judgment in terminating a share-

holders' derivative action seeking damages against fellow direc-

tors. 19 In such a situation, the court must confine its inquiry to
assessing the "independence" of the members of the committee

and the appropriateness and adequacy of the investigative procedures selected and pursued by the committee.10 0 In so holding, the

court concluded that the substantive aspects of the committee's
decision to bar a shareholders' derivative suit "is beyond judicial
inquiry under the business judgment doctrine." 10 1
95. Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713, 717 (E.D. Va. 1980). The
shareholders' derivative suit alleged that, in defeating an attempted takeover by a potential
acquirer, the defendant directors violated § 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(1976), and breached their fiduciary duties under state law.
96. 495 F. Supp. at 717. In this case, the shareholder made no demand on the board
prior to instituting suit because a majority of the current directors were named as
defendants.
97. Id. See SEC. REo. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 569, at A-10 (Sept. 10, 1980).
98. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
99. Id. at 630-34, 393 N.E.2d at 1000-02, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926-28.
100. Id. at 634-35, 393 N.E.2d at 1002-03, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
101. Id. at 623, 633, 393 N.E.2d at 926, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 922, 928. The court also
expressly rejected the intervenor's contention that any committee appointed by the directors, some of whom were defendants, was legally infirm and thus had no authority to bar a
derivative suit. The court stated:
To accept the assertions of the intervenor and to disqualify the entire board
would be to render the corporation powerless to make an effective business judgment with respect to prosecution of the derivative action. The possible risk of
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Two recent New York lower court decisions have applied
Auerbach. In Falkenberg v. Baldwin,1 0 2 the Supreme Court of New
York County held that a committee composed of outside directors
of Uniroyal Corporation exercised its business judgment in recommending dismissal of a shareholders' derivative suit alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (discrimination
against female employees) by corporate officers and directors. 10' In
so holding, the court placed the burden on the plaintiffs to show
lack of independence or insufficient investigative procedures by the
committee.'0 4 The second case, Parkoff v. General Telephone and
Electronics Corp.,105 relying directly on Auerbach, held that a decision to terminate a shareholders' derivative action against the defendant directors for alleged waste of corporate assets and breach
of fiduciary duties in connection with questionable foreign payments lay within the business judgment of a special litigation committee composed of three outside directors, who were not directors
at the time of the transactions at issue. 06
Although subsequently reversed by the New York Court of
Appeals, the lower appellate court's opinion in Auerbach10 7 may be
deemed relevant by courts in other jurisdictions. In holding that
the business judgment rule could not be invoked to allow summary
dismissal of a shareholders' derivative suit alleging breach of
fiduciary duty, the lower court approved the propriety of inquiring
hesitancy on the part of the members of any committee, even if composed of
outside, independent, disinterested directors, to investigate the activities of fellow members of the board where personal liability is at stake is an inherent,
inescapable, given aspect of the corporation's predicament. To assign responsibility of the dimension here involved to individuals wholly separate and apart
from the board of directors would, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, itself be an act of default and breach of the non-delegable fiduciary duty
owed by the members of the board to the corporation and to its shareholders,
employees and creditors. For the courts to preside over such determinations
would similarly work an ouster of the board's fundamental responsibility and
authority for corporate management.
Id. at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. But see Chief Judge Cooke's dissent in
Auerbach, where he asserted that "[s]ince the continuation of the suit is dependent, in large
measure, upon the motives and actions of the defendants and the special litigation committee, and since knowledge of the matters 'is peculiarly in the possession of the defendants
themselves', summary judgment should not be granted prior to disclosure proceedings." Id.
at 637, 393 N.E.2d at 1004, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 931 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
102. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 645, at A-14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 3, 1980).
103. Id. (relying on Auerbach).
104. Id.
105. 74 A.D.2d 762, 425 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1980).
106. Id. at 764, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
107. Auerbach v. Bennett, 64 A.D.2d 98, 408 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1978).
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into the reasonableness of the investigative committee's decision. 0 8
Factors that such a committee must consider in an improper payments case, and which a court presumably must assess, include
"the reasons for the payments, the advantages or disadvantages accruing to the corporation by reason of the transactions, the extent
of the participation or profit by the respondent directors and the
loss, if any, of public confidence in the corporation which might be
incurred."'0 9 In addition, the court emphasized that the hesitancy
that outside directors may have in investigating the activities of
their fellow directors, particularly when personal liability is at
stake, "is a consideration of moment.""
As a final caveat, it should be mentioned that although both
Auerbach and Maldonado contained allegations of breaches of
fiduciary duty, Auerbach involved questionable foreign payments
whereas Maldonado concerned a stock option plan."' Thus distinguished, the decisions in Auerbach and Maldonado may be compatible. Unlike a number of shareholder derivative actions,"' including the Auerbach suit, the situation in Maldonado involved
direct self-dealing on the part of the defendant directors." 8 In
such a situation, even assuming that the directors composing the
special litigation committee do not "stand in a dual relation which
prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment,"' 14 the appearance
of impropriety may be so great as to preclude the committee from
terminating the shareholders' suit. On the other hand, it is possible
that when the alleged actions by the defendant directors have not
108. Id. at 106-08, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 87-88; see Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp.,
582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
109. 64 A.D.2d at 107, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 87-88.
110. Id. at 107, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 88. Speaking of the business judgment rule in this
context, the court asserted:
The business judgment doctrine should not be interpreted to stifle legitimate
scrutiny by stockholders of decisions of management which, concededly, require
investigation by outside directors and present ostensible situations of conflict of
interest. Nor should the report of the outside directors be immune from scrutiny
by an interpretation of the doctrine which compels the acceptance of the findings of the report on their face. In particular, summary judgment which ends a
derivative action at the threshold, before the plaintiff has been afforded the opportunity of pretrial discovery and examination before trial, should not be the
means of foreclosing a nonfrivolous action.
Id. at 107-08, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
111. Compare 47 N.Y.2d at 623-25, 393 N.E.2d at 996-97, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 922-23, with
413 A.2d at 1254.
112. See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 1979); Abbey v. Control
Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 726-27 (8th Cir. 1979).
113. See 413 A.2d at 1254-55.
114. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264 (1917).
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inured to their direct benefit or do not involve conflicts of interest
or other dishonest or fraudulent conduct, courts will permit a special litigation committee to bar a shareholders' derivative suit,
under certain conditions.
IV.

FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE USE OF SPECIAL LITIGATION
COMMITTEES TO BAR SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUITS

To find a proper solution to this issue is a difficult proposition.
As pointed out by the Ninth Circuit, to permit one stockholder to
incapacitate an entire board of directors merely by alleging their
having breached a fiduciary duty gives too much power to dissident shareholders. 115 Further, to disable the board from terminating derivative actions could well saddle the corporation with expensive and vexatious litigation." e On the other hand, to allow
directors to bar lawsuits against their fellow directors raises serious
questions of conflicts of interest and ignores the inherent problem
of "structural bias." 17 In this vein, there is certainly something to
115. See Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d at 783. The court also stated that "[t]here is no
reason to believe that a minority shareholder is more likely to act in the best interest of the
corporation than are directors who are elected by a majority of the stockholders." Id. Although this assertion is certainly true in the ordinary management of the corporation, it
clearly is not when management is alleged to have engaged in conflicts of interest, selfdealing, or fraud.
116. See Dent, supra note 9, at 98.
117. "Structural bias" may be defined as "inherent prejudice against any derivative action resulting from the composition and character of the board of directors." Note, The
Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 600,
601 n.14 (1980). In a recent decision, the Fifth Circuit recognized the problem of structural
bias, holding that, because of conflicts of interest, a corporation's board of directors was
incompetent to compromise the plaintiff shareholders' derivative claims. Clark v. Lomas &
Nettleton Financial Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980).
In an interesting and provocative article, one commentator argues that the courts have
largely ignored the structural bias problem in shareholder derivative suits. In so doing, the
commentator contends that courts have effectively insulated corporate malfeasants from liability. In conclusion, the commentator asserts:
Current judicial treatment of derivative actions against directors threatens to
eliminate the utility of such suits. By applying the business judgment and demand rules originally designed for derivative suits against third parties to suits
against directors, most courts have failed to recognize the inherent structural
bias that corporate boards exhibit toward actions against directors. The use of
special litigation committees has magnified the problem. Courts should only allow directors accused of wrongdoing to raise the business judgment rule as a
defense to the alleged violation at a trial on the merits. They should retain the
demand rule as a procedural requisite for derivative plaintiffs to give the corporation an opportunity to conduct the litigation. If the corporation declines that
invitation, courts should allow the shareholder-plaintiff to pursue the claim.
Note, supra at 632-33.
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be said for the Delaware Court of Chancery's observation that aggrieved shareholders, when suing directors of their corporation for
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, are entitled to receive judgment
from an impartial tribunal rather than from a committee appointed by the alleged wrongdoers. 118
As noted earlier, the appearance of impartiality may be as important as impartiality in fact. To the shareholder seeking redress
on behalf of the corporation, judicial deference to a special litigation committee's decision to terminate the suit smacks of unfairness. To counteract this effect as much as practicable, yet retain
the board's authority to bar such suits, a court in this situation
should scrutinize the committee's composition and decision to assure that the committee is, in fact, independent and disinterested,
and that its determination is reasonable under all of the
circumstances.' 19
Some courts and commentators have concluded that assessing
the "reasonableness" of the committee's judgment is outside the
purview of the business judgment rule.120 Even assuming arguendo
that such a position is technically correct, one should recognize
that the use of special litigation committees to bar shareholder derivative suits against fellow directors is extraordinary. Indeed,
three courts interpreting state law have placed this determination
118. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d at 1262-63; see notes 80-85 and accompanying text
supra. Note also that the issue remains whether a board of directors can validly delegate its
authority to a special litigation committee, since a number of state statutes provide that
committees serve "at the pleasure of the board." See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 311 (West
1977); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1527 (1973); N.Y. Bus. CORP.'LAW § 712(c) (McKinney
Supp. 1979). Such statutes raise questions about the validity of the board's delegation of
"binding" authority to the special litigation committee. See Note, supra note 117, at 618,
619.
119. See generally Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978):
[W]e do not think that the business judgment of the directors should be totally
insulated from judicial review. In order for the directors' judgment to merit judicial deference, that judgment must have been made in good faith and independently of any influence of those persons suspected of wrongdoing. In addition,
where the shareholder contends that the directors' judgment is so unwise or unreasonable as to fall outside the permissible bounds of the directors' sound discretion, a court should, we think, be able to conduct its own analysis of the reasonableness of that business judgment.
Id. at 275. See Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 57-64 (2d Cir. 1980); Maher v. Zapata Corp.,
490 F. Supp. 348, 351-54 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch.
1980).
120. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 633-35, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002-03,
419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928-29 (1979); Olson, Courts Firm Against Creation of U.S. Corporation
Law, Legal Times (Wash.), April 2, 1980, at 42.
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outside the province of the business judgment rule.121 Even if
viewed within the rule, such a determination nevertheless reflects
different policies than those present in the ordinary corporate decision clearly protected by the doctrine.12 2 A relevant analogy can be
drawn from derivative suits challenging "interested transactions"
between a corporation and its officers or directors. In these situations, even if a majority of disinterested directors approve such a
transaction, the prevailing view is that the transaction's fairness to
the corporation will be rigorously scrutinized.2 2 The rationale for
this approach equally applies to the issue of litigation termination:
even if disinterested directors make that decision, the pressure to
disregard the corporation's best interests is so great that only a
court's careful scrutiny of the directors' conduct will ensure the
24
protection of the entity's welfare.1
In addition, the members who compose the special litigation
committee should be both disinterested and independent. At the
very least, "disinterested" should signify that the directors did not
authorize or approve the challenged transaction and are not named
as defendants in the law suit.1' 5 Further, the term "independent"
should signify that the members of the committee are not subject
to the defendants' influence and can exercise independent judgment on behalf of the corporation. The "independence" of the
members, particularly if selected by the defendants, should be subject to rigorous scrutiny. Any prior contacts or relationships between the members and the defendants should be examined with
121. Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980) (Virginia
law); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. at 351 (Delaware law); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413
A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980).
122. See Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 689 (E.D. Mich. 1980) ("The court is
aware that application of the business judgment rule to circumstances where a committee is
charged with the responsibility of determining whether shareholder litigation should continue is an expansion of the traditional rule."). See also Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d at
1255-63.
123. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem.
Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 88, 90 A.2d 660, 663 (1952); Abeles v. Adams Eng'r Co., 35 N.J. 411,
428-29, 173 A.2d 246, 255 (1961); Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and
CorporateMorality, 22 Bus. LAw. 35, 43 (1966). Additionally, it is important to emphasize
that the business judgment rule does not apply in the scrutiny of such transactions. See
notes 7-10 supra.
124. See Dent, supra note 9, at 121, 122, 137. Note that under this standard, the court
scrutinizes the "reasonableness" of the special litigation committee's determination, avoiding the result that "almost any decision to terminate a derivative action will appear 'reasonable' to a 'reasonable' special litigation committee." Note, supra note 117, at 626.
125. See Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59-61 (2d Cir. 1980); Abbey v. Control Data
Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1979); Nussbacher v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 444 F.
Supp. 973, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).

SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES

19801

care. Particularly if a member stands to gain financially or other-

wise by determining that the derivative suit should be terminated,
his "independent" status should be inherently suspect. 'MFurther,
although some courts have placed the burden on the sharehold-

ers,12 7 such burden of establishing independence should be placed
on the parties seeking dismissal. When the defendants have selected the committee members, the appearance of impropriety (indeed, perhaps the presence of it) can be remedied only if the persons who made that selection satisfy the court on the issue of
1 28
independence.
Because the pleadings are usually inadequate for the court to
assess the reasonableness of the special litigation committee's judgment, including such issues as whether the members were fully informed of the facts material to their decision' and whether the
particular members were in fact independent, it is appropriate for
the court to permit limited discovery. 30 Despite entailing some expense and inconvenience to the corporation, discovery is necessary
for the court to rule in an informed manner on the defendants'
motion to dismiss the complaint. " '
As a final comment, Maldonado in Delaware and its prog-

eny

2

may well have as their benchmark the theme of corporate

accountability. Although corporations are ordinarily managed
under the direction of their directors, "8 this line of cases indicates
that at least some courts are showing less tolerance for self-dealing
and conflicts of interest by directors that cause hardship to shareholders of publicly held corporations.8 4 Viewed from this perspec126. See Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d at 60-61; Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp.
348, 353-54 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d at 1253-63; note 69 supra.
127. See Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d at 783; Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d at 633-35,
393 N.E.2d at 1002-03, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29; Falkenberg v. Baldwin, SEC. REG. & L. Rm.
(BNA) No. 545, at A-14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 3, 1980). But see cases cited note 85 supra.
128. "Plaintiffs' allegation that the Committee merely conducted a 'rationalization' of
the claims instead of an investigation since the exculpation of Defendants' conduct was foreordained is not totally incomprehensible in view of the fact that the Committee was appointed by the alleged wrongdoers." Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. at 354.
129. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 64 A.D.2d 98, 106-07, 408 N.Y.S.2d 83, 87-88 (1978). See
Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 18, Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
130. See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d at 783; Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp.
274, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp.
817, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); notes
23-24 and accompanying text supra.
131. See Brief for the SEC, supra note 129, at 16.
132. See authorities cited notes 76 & 77 supra.
133. See authorities cited note 7 supra.
134. The Goldberg v. Meridor line of rule 10b-5 cases provides further examples of this
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tive, the decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery is refreshing.
Regardless of whether other tribunals follow Maldonado's rationale on the applicability of the business judgment rule in this context, one can only hope that they will respect and heed its zealous
concern for corporate accountability.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the complexities intertwined with director dismissal
of shareholder derivative suits against fellow directors may sometimes appear incapable of resolution, certain criteria may be set
forth to guide the conduct of special litigation committees. First,
from decisions thus far, less than a quorum of directors can properly act for the corporation in seeking the termination of a shareholders' derivative action. 3 5 Second, although the decisions arguably are conflicting,'8 6 the wisest course of action would be to name
only nondefendant, disinterested, and independent persons to the
special litigation committee. Third, the board should delegate
binding, nonreviewable authority to the committee to investigate
and determine whether the suit is in the corporation's best interests. 87 Fourth, the committee should employ thorough investigative procedures.3 8s Fifth, the board should inform committee members of all facts material to their decision to help ensure that the
judgment reached is reasonable.' 3 ' And, as a final caveat, the special litigation committee should conduct itself so as to withstand
strict judicial scrutiny.
Although the principles outlined above and throughout this
article may not guarantee vindication of the shareholders' and corporation's grievances, they will help ensure, if diligently applied by
the courts, increased accountability for directors' conduct. In a
judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980);
Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. Alabama Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 77 (1980); Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d
1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1069 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1066 (1978). For an analysis of this trend, see Ferrara and Steinberg, supra note 29.
135. See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d at 782 n.1; Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F.
Supp. at 286.
136. Compare Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d at 783, with Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d at
60-61, 63-64.
137. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. at 283. But see note 118 supra.
138. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d at 634-35, 393 N.E.2d at 1002-03, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 929.
139. See generally Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir.
1978); cases cited -note 119 supra.
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world where corporations fear "strike suits," sometimes with good
4 and where the business judgment rule protects directors
reason,"'
as the monitors of our corporations, 4 ' perhaps this approach is
most practicable. On the other hand, when directors' alleged actions involve conflicts of interests, fraud, or self-dealing, which inure to their direct benefit, there is much to be said for the approach adopted by the Delaware Court of Chancery in
Maldonado."' Whichever approach ultimately prevails, the courts
should strive to implement the principle of corporate accountability and, in this manner, promote investor confidence in the integrity of the marketplace and the governance of our publicly held
companies.

140. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737-48 (1975). With
regard to strike suits, the Supreme Court has stated:
[I]n the field of federal securities laws governing disclosure of information even a
complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of success at
trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect
of success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit from being resolved against
him by dismissal or summary judgment. The very pendency of the lawsuit may
frustrate or delay normal business activity of the defendant which is totally unrelated to the lawsuit.
Id. at 740 (citations omitted). Arguably, however, the courts may combat the potential of
vexatious litigation by measures such as requiring plaintiffs to post security for expenses,
requiring judicial review of derivative settlements, and granting summary judgment motions. See Note, supra note 117, at 632. A number of states now require the posting of
security for expenses. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:3-6(3) (West Supp. 1976); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1979); MODEL
Bus. CORP. AcT § 59, V 2 (1976). Recently, the Second Circuit held that, pursuant to New
York law, the trial court properly dismissed a shareholder's derivative suit for failure to post
the required security. The court concluded that the shareholder's acquisition of stock after
the commencement of the action was not sufficient to obviate the security requirement. Haberman v. Tobin, 626 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1980).
141. See notes 7-15 and accompanying text supra.
142. See notes 80-85, 111-14, and accompanying text supra. See also Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 688 (E.D. Mich. 1980) ("[Uinlike in Maldonado, there is no
allegation of personal gain by the directors.. . ."). Unlike certain commentaries, this article declines to draw a distinction between derivative suits naming a majority of directors as
defendants and suits naming only a minority of directors. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 9. To
draw such a distinction would be to conclude that the impartiality of the special litigation
committee depends on the number of directors named as defendants. Such a conclusion is
unwarranted. The inherent problems of structural bias remain, regardless of whether the
complaint accuses a majority or a minority of directors of wrongdoing. See Note, supra note
117, at 629. See also Cohen v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 491, 494-95 (S.D.N.Y.
1942).

